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IN THE SUPREME COU.RT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
~.\.N .IUAN COUNTY and STATE 
re.\X COl\LMISSION OF UTAH, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
VS 
.1 l1:N, INC., a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case 
No. 
10146 
Defendant and respondent (hereinafter the parties 
\\"ill be referred to as plaintiffs and defendant) agrees 
with the State1nent of Facts by plaintiffs so far as stated. 
For convenience defendant will briefly summarize the 
procedure and include a brief statement of admitted 
facts. 
The case as argued before the trial court was on a 
motion to dis1niss plaintiffs' complaint. The memorand-
um decision written by Judge Keller (and which is a 
part of the record) held for the defendant on the ground 
that there could be no personal liability for real property 
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taxes. Thereafter, additional facts not set forth in the 
complaint were stipulated, and the formal judgment of 
the court was entered as on a motion for summary 
judgment. (All emphases are added by defendant unless 
otherwise indicated.) 
The admitted facts are: 
1. The defendant owned and operated ·The J en, The 
Jackie, Uncle Ben, Pasco, and a part of the Enigma 
F·raction mining claims during 1957, 1958, and a part 
of 19·5·9·. 
2.. In December of 1959, the mining claims were 
worked out, had no further value and were formally 
abandoned by defendant. Defendant's title thereupon 
ceased and defendant has not owned said mining claims 
at any time during the years 1960, 1961, and 1962. 
3. Defendant filed the required reports on forms 
furnished by the tax commission for all of the years it 
operated, the 19·59 operations being reported in 1960. 
The 1960 report expressly stated that it was filed without 
admission of any liability for the payment of the ad 
valorem tax for the year 1960. 
4. The state tax commission assessed the ad valorem 
tax for 1960 based upon the average net proceeds for 
the years 19·57, '58, and '59 at $288,204.50. 
5. This tax was not paid and there was an automatic 
sale· of the property in January of 19Gl, pursuant to 
Section 59-10-33 Utah Code Annotated, 19·5·3. 
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li. ~imilar assPsstnents were 1nade for the years 
1961 in the amount of $:2:2:2,:240.66 and 1962 in the amount 
ol' $11J,(iG1.96 with the consequent tax sales the following 
.I an nary, the~w taxPs being calculated upon a three-year 
avt•ragt•, tlw operations for 1960 and 1961 being calulated 
at zero. 
STATE~lENT OF POINTS 
Dt>fPndant relies upon the following points to sustain 
tht• judgment of the trial court: 
POINT I 
ASSUMING A "PERSONAL LIABILITY," THE STATE 
TAX COl\Il\IISSION HAS NO RIGHT TO SUE. 
POINT II 
ASSUMING A "PERSONAL LIABILITY," SAN JUAN 
COUNTY HAS NO RIGHT TO SUE. 
POINT III 
THERE IS NO "PERSONAL LIABILITY" FOR REAL 
PROPERTY TAXES, INCLUDING REAL PROPERTY TAXES 
BASED UPON NET PROCEEDS. 
POINT IV 
EVEN IF THE PLAINTIFFS OR ANY CONSTITUTED 
AUTHORITY IS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT FOR TAXES, 
THAT JUDGMENT HAS ALREADY BEEN ENTERED AND 
THERE l\IAY NOT BE ANOTHER JUDGMENT. 
POINT V 
THE JUDGMENT PROVIDED FOR BY SECTION 59-10-1 
WAS SATISFIED BY THE TAX SALE TO SAN JUAN 
COUXTY PURSUANT TO SECTION 59-10-33. 
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POINT VI 
IN THIS CASE THERE CAN BE NO VALID AD VAL-
OREM REAL PROPERTY TAXES FOR 1960, 1961, AND 1962 
FOR THE REASON THAT THERE WAS NO PROPERTY 
VALUE AT ANY TIME DURING SAID THREE YEARS. 
POINT VII 
IN THIS CASE THERE CAN BE NO VALID AD VAL-
OREM REAL PROPERTY TAXES FOR THE YEARS 1960, 
1961 AND 1962 FOR THE REASON THAT THERE WAS NO 
OWNERSHIP BY THE DEFENDANT DURING THE YEARS 
IN QUESTION. 
POINT VIII 
THE REGULATIONS OF THE TAX COMMISSION AND 
SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATION BY THE 1963 LEGISLATURE 
ARE RECOGNITIONS OF THE INEQUITY OF THE TAX 
AND ITS INVALIDITY UNDER SECTIONS 2 AND 3 OF 
ARTICLE XIII UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
POINT IX 
A PROPER CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 59~5-57 RE-
QUIRES THE ELIMINATION OF THE TAXES FOR 1961 
AND 1962. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ASSUMING A "PERSONAL LIABILITY," THE STATE 
TAX COMMISSION HAS NO RIGHT TO SUE. 
This is the question argued as Point I by plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs cite only statutory provisions. We call atten-
tion to Section 59-8-2, U.C . .A., 1953, which provides: 
". . . and the whole tax shall be carried into a 
column of aggregates, and shall be collected by the 
county treasurer at the time and in the manner 
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5 
provided hy law for collecting state and county 
taxes." 
~\'P more particularly as to net proceeds tax, Section 
;JD-5-65, which provides: 
"The tax mentioned in the preceding sections on 
mines and mining claims, and mining property, 
shall be collected and the payment thereof en-
forced in the manner provided for the collection 
and enforc(_'lnent of other taxes; ... " 
Thi~, it ~eems to us, is a sufficient answer to the argu-
lllPnt that the tax eounnission has the right to a judgment 
a~ain~t the defendant. Plaintiffs' sole authority appears 
to be Section 59-5--±G, U.C.A., 1953, which is a general 
right in the tax cmnmission to sue and to be sued in its 
mn1 na1ne. Certainly this general power does not entitle 
the state tax com1nission in its own name to perform 
tlw funetions expressly given to the taxing authorities 
of tlw counties. The state tax commission is not author-
iz€'d to collect the taxes in question with or without suit 
or to give a receipt therefor. As above-mentioned and 
8tated by plaintiffs, the taxes on mines, though the mines 
are assessed by the tax commission, are collected by 
the count !J trea.surer. 
Other sections show that though the tax commission 
makes the assessn1ent, the assessed valuation is given by 
the ta.~ con1mission to the county assessor and the pro-
cedure for collection is entirely by the county treasurer. 
~ee Sections 59-5-2 ; 59-6-2, where the county assessor 
must enter the amount assessed by the tax commission on 
the assessment roll of the county; 59-8-8, where the 
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county auditor charges the county treasurer ''with the 
full amount of taxes levied except for taxes of car 
companies and automobiles, motor stages, motor trans-
ports and trailers employed in common-carrier business;" 
59-10-12, which requires the county treasurer to give a 
receipt to all persons paying taxes; 59-10-13, which re-
quires the county treasurer to make settlement with 
the county commission for all monies collected. If these 
things must be done by the county officials, how can 
the money be collected by or paid to the state tax com-
mission~ A judgment by the commission requires pay-
ment to the tax commission. 
It may he interesting and helpful to note other sec-
tions of the statute expressly conferring upon the state 
tax commission the right to collect other taxes or take 
action with respect thereto. Under Sections 59-10-20 and 
59-10-30 the tax commission is given express authority to 
collect taxes on the property of "car companies and the 
owners of automobiles, motor stages, motor transport and 
trailers employed in common-carrier business." Under 
Sections 59-10-23, 24 and 25, the state tax commission is 
empowered to take certain action in case of threatened 
depletion of mines or mining claims. Certain specific 
steps must be taken by the tax commission. That pro-
cedure is not involved in this case. Even if it were, it 
does not provide for personal liability. 
·The failure of plaintiff to cite a single case where the 
state tax commission or a county of this state has been 
permitted to sue to collect ad valorem taxes is the answer 
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in itself to thi~ question. There is no statutory authority 
l'or Pitlwr the statt> tax conunission or a county to sue. 
POINT II 
ASSUMING A "PERSONAL LIABILITY," SAN JUAN 
COUNTY HAS NO RIGHT TO SUE. 
Plaintiffs at the outset concede that suit in the name 
or t IH' ('Otmty treasurer "perhaps would have been more 
appropriate." The sections relied upon for the right of 
Nan Juan Count;' to sue are 17-4-3; 17-5-24; 17-5-50; and 
17-5-54. These are all general statutes not specifically 
rt'iating to the right to bring a suit to collect taxes. That 
such statutes do not mean that in every circumstance 
the county can sue and be sued is stated in Shaw v. Salt 
/,ake County, 119 Utah 50, 224 P.2d 1037. In referring 
to Section 17-4-3 ( 1), which gives the county the power 
"to ::me and to be sued," the court said 
"Subdivision (1) of this section is but a 
general grant constituting the county an entity 
to sue and be sued, where it may under other ap-
plicable stattdes or principles, properly be sued 
or sue ; it is not a blanket authorization for suits 
to be brought against counties.'' 
The other section noted by plaintiffs is 59-10-16, 
which, as pointed out by plaintiffs, gives the county 
treasurer the right to sue in the name of the county where 
personal property, after being assessed, is removed 
from one county to another. Plaintiffs state on page 5 
that there is no other provision "allowing the treasurer 
to sue or be sued." Plaintiffs have omitted to mention 
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Section 59-11-11 which permits suit against the treasurer 
of the county where taxes have been paid under protest. 
The argument seems to be that since the statute does 
not specifically give the county treasurer the right to 
sue to collect taxes on the basis of a "personal liability," 
therefore, the suit may he brought in the name of San 
Juan County. Admittedly, our statutes do not give the 
county treasurer the right to sue for a personal judg-
ment. This does not mean, however, that the county has 
the right to sue. It rather indicates that there can be no 
suit. In addition to sections relating to the duties of the 
county treasurer with respect to taxes, cited under Point 
I, we call attention to Section 17-16-11 which places the 
county treasurer under bond for the safe-keeping of all 
monies and Section 17-24-1 to 17-24-21 which give to the 
county treasurer full responsibility for county funds. 
That the county cannot take over the responsibility 
of statutory county officers is indicated in the case of 
Sheriffof Salt Lake County v. Board of County Com-
missioners of Salt Lake County, 71 Utah 593, 268 Pac. 
783. In this case the county commission attempted to 
remove a deputy county sheriff. The statute provided 
that deputies could only be appointed with the consent 
of the county commissioners. Nevertheless, it was held 
that the discharge of a deputy was the sole responsibility 
of the county sheriff, and that the county commission 
could not upsurp that function. The court said: 
"The sheriff's office is an elective office of 
the county, as is also the office of a county com-
missioner, and is a coordinate office or branch 
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of our eounty government. His powers and duties 
an~ prt>~-wrilwd by statute and are similar to those 
gl'Jwrally prt>~eribed by other western states. 
In pc rfo rming them, he, generally spe·aking, acts 
i11depcndelltl.lJ of the board of county commis-
sioners except as otherwise restricted and speci-
fied by statute." 
At this point ·we call attention to the fact that the 
t·omplaint is in the fonn of two causes of action, one by 
the statP tax conunission and the other by San Juan 
t 10unty. The complaint prays for judgment for the full 
amount of the tax in both causes. In other words, it asks 
for a judgment in favor of the state tax commission for 
the full a1nount of the taxes and for another judgment 
in favor of San Juan County for the full amount. Plain-
tiffs do not state or claim to know which plaintiff should 
han' judgment. 
Plaintiffs' brief claims only that the state tax com-
mission may join in "an atternpt to collect taxes due for 
and on behalf of San Juan County." (page 5·) With re-
~pect to the right of San Juan County to sue it is con-
cPded in plaintiffs' brief as above mentioned, that suit 
in the name of the treasurer "perhaps would have been 
more appropriate." (page 5) 
POINT III 
THERE IS NO "PERSONAL LIABILITY" FOR REAL 
PROPERTY TAXES, INCLUDING REAL PROPERTY TAXES 
BASED ON NET PROCEEDS. 
It should be kept in mind that the so-called "net 
proceeds tax" is an ad valorem real property tax. The 
net proceeds fornn1la is merely a means by which the 
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value of the property is assessed. Should this court hold 
that there is "personal liability" for real property tax, 
then all property owners may be sued. We submit that 
this would be a very far reaching decision, would give 
rise to many difficulties, and be a deterrent to the owner-
ship of real property. The question of who is the owner 
is sometimes a difficult one and calls for judicial deter-
mination, not administrative. Be that as it may, the ques-
tion is whether or not our tax laws as now constituted 
do provide for "personal liability." 
An interesting statement in plaintiffs' brief is found 
on page 6 where it is stated: 
"·The primary question presented to the Court 
is whether a mining company incurs personal li-
ability by depleting mineral assets, paying no tax 
thereon, and then abandoning the depleted mining 
claim, the fee title to which was never owned by 
it." 
This suggests that the plaintiffs have in mind some spe-
cial ''personal liability" with respect to real property 
taxes on mining claims which do not apply to taxes on 
real property generally. We submit that there can be no 
different rule with respect to ad valorem real property 
taxes on unpatented mining claims than on patented min-
ing claims or all other real property. Authorities relied 
upon by plaintiffs must apply equally to all real property 
taxes. 
The only Utah statute relied upon by plaintiffs is 
Section 59-10-1 quoted at page 7 of their brief and the 
only Utah cases are Hayes v. Gibbs, 110 Utah 54, 169 
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P.~d 781; Crystal Car Line et al u. State Ta.c Commission 
of Utah, 110 Utah -!:2(), 17-! P.:2d 984; and Crismon, 
..lsst·ssor, wul Suit Ll~ke County v. Reich, 2 Utah 111. 
The earliest Utah case on the subject is Crismon, 
County .Assessor, et al u. Reich, 2 Utah 111, cited by 
t itP plaintiffs. In that case, the plaintiffs asked for 
a personal judg1nent. The court expressly held that 
no pt'r:-;onal judgn1ent could be taken. Plaintiffs' attempt 
to tab' emnfort frmn this case because in rnaking its 
ruling the court stated that: 
". . . when ample powers and means are afforded 
by statute for the collection of taxes without suit, 
and when there is no statute providing for suit to 
be brought for taxes, no action can he maintained 
therefor." (page 5 of plaintiff's brief) 
The court did not hold that just because the state, the 
county, or the county treasurer has not been able to 
collect taxes that there is then created a personal liability. 
Another early case following the Reich case is Kerr 
v. lroolcy, 3 Utah 456, where it is simply stated in the 
headnote reflecting the decision of the case that "Suit 
i::; not the proper ren1edy for the collecting of a tax unless 
l'xpressly given by statute." 
In the case of Richards 1:. State Tax Commission, 
9:2 rtah 503, 69 P.2d 515, the plaintiff brought suit 
against the tax commssion and others for the purpose 
of quieting title to property which plaintiff had pur-
rhased from the county after the receipt by the county 
of a tax deed. Apparently the purchase price from the 
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county was for less than the taxes, and it was claimed 
by the defendant tax commission that the taxes were not 
extinguished by a sale to the county. The court said: 
"Taxes are levied against the property. The pro-
perty against which the levy is made is subject to 
the processes and procedure relating to the col-
lection, and disposition of the property in event 
the owner or any one interested in the property 
neglects or refuses to pay taxes properly assessed. 
When the tax law remedies have been exhausted, 
there is no debt or liability existing due to the 
state or any subdivision thereof from the former 
owner, or for that matter, from a purchaser after 
he has pa.id the agreed price and accepted convey-
ance." 
Plaintiffs place some reliance upon the concurring 
opinion of Mr. Justice Wolfe in the case of Ra;yes v. 
Gibbs, 110 Utah 54, 169· P.2d 781. After quoting from 
statutes Mr. Justice Wolfe stated: 
"Certainly this smacks of an assessment 
against the person rather than a charge against 
the realty alone - the tax debt being a lien 
against the realty of the owner." 
An analysis of the Hayes v. Gibbs case clearly indicates 
that Mr. Justice Wolfe was only speculating and he was 
not determining that a personal judgment could be taken 
against the owner of real property for taxes. The ques-
tion in the case was whether or not, when the defendant 
Gibbs purchased the property at tax sale from the 
county, certain building restrictions in the chain of title 
continued or whether the restrictive covenants no longer 
existed. In other words, did the tax title create an en-
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t i rt>ly new fet~ ~intple title. The majority opinion by 
.JI r. .J ll~tiet> Lar~on and concurred in by Justices Wade 
and ~I e Donongh silnply held that the restrictive coven-
ants wt>n' not Pxtingished by the tax sale. It was pointed 
out that the a::-~sessed valuation was based on the fact that 
there were restrictive covenants which applied to the 
Pntin• area and that the restrictive covenants therefore 
constituted a part of the title sold at the tax sale. See 
ht'<Hlnotes 11, 12, and 13. 
~lr. Justice Wolfe wrote a concurring opinion point-
ing out the danger of putting decisions on any particular 
theory. He stated: 
''While I am in agreement therefore with the 
result that easements and building restrictions 
are not extinguished by valid tax foreclosure pro-
cedure, I run doubtful as to the reason given for 
that result. In order to assure myself of the 
correct basis I would be compelled to make an 
exploration which would consume much effort 
and time. After all, the holding in this case rather 
than the ascertainment of the correct reasons for 
it is of paramount importance." (page 71) 
.Jlr. Justice Wolfe expressly pointed out that statutes 
permitting a personal liability were repealed by the 
1933 revision of our statutes. He stated at page 76 of 
the Ftah report: 
·'Section 6090-6092, Compiled Laws of Utah 
1917, provided for personal suit against a tax 
debtor for the delinquent tax when there was no 
sale of the property upon which the tax was a lien 
when said property ·was once offered for tax sale. 
These sections did not survive the 1933 revision 
of the statutes." 
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Mr. Justice Wolfe further stated : 
"It may be that the tax is one against the person 
but the procedure to collect it confined to the 
sale of his property and in that sense a proceed-
ing in rem although Sec. 80-10-3 and some of the 
other sections would seem to be somewhat against 
that view." (page 76) 
From the foregoing, it is clear that Mr. Justice 
Wolfe in the Hayes v. Gibbs case did not conclude that 
there could be a "personal liability." He rather leaned 
to the theory that the only procedure to collect the tax 
was against the property itself. His final conclusion 
was that: 
'~Because of public necessity, I agree that mort-
gages and most other liens, including tax liens 
and most likely dower and some other interests, 
are extinguished by valid tax foreclosure proced-
ure but not easements." (page 77) 
Plaintiffs cite and rely upon the case of Crystal Car 
Line et al v. State Tax Commission) 110 Utah 426, 174 
P.2d 98'4. This case was decided November 29, 1946, ap-
proximately six months after Hayes v. Gibbs. Plaintiffs' 
brief contains two quotations from this case. The first 
from the majority opinion, by Mr. Justice Wade, that: 
"The statutory provision that 'every tax has the 
effect of a judgment against the person' means 
that the tax shall be collected in the same way a.s 
a judgment unless otherwise expressly provided 
and limited." (page 8 plaintiff's brief) 
The second is from the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice 
Larson wherein he states: 
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. 1 ~ue no n~ason why an action 1nay not lie 
for unpaid taxe8 on personal property where the 
~nmrnary proeueding of seizure under the tax laws 
is not pradical." (pages 8 and 9 plaintiff's brief) 
N ('i ther of tlH'8P quotations, even if they represented 
the holding of the case, apply to the present situation. 
lf the first quotation is applied to the present case, some-
onl', possibly San Juan County, has a judgment as pro-
vided for in Section 59-10-1, and this judgment must be 
t•ol!Pdt•d a~ provided for in Chapter 10 of Title 59. There 
ii:i already a judgment which must be collected as therein 
provided and there is no provision for a deficiency judg-
nwnt. The second quotation by Mr. Justice Larson 
n•lates only to unpaid taxes on personal property. 
rrlw Crystal Car Line case did not hold that a per-
sonal judg1nent was possible even for personal property 
taxl's, and certainly did not hold that there could be 
pl•rsonal liability for real property ad valorem taxes. 
The case arose upon the seizure by the tax commission 
of ears of the Crystal Car Line to satisfy taxes imposed 
under our statute by the tax commission and collectible 
by the tax cmnmission under the then Section 80-10-29, 
F.C.4\., 1943, now Section 59-10-30, U.C.A., 1953. The 
court having held that the cars were properly seized, the 
qnl'stion 1n1s then whether or not the action was barred 
by the statute of limitations. On this point, the problem 
before the court was stated as follows by Mr. Justice 
'Yade: 
"However, unless the seizure of this car for the 
purpose of sale, under section 80-10-29, U.C.A., 
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1943, by the tax commission was "an action" as 
that term is used in section 104-2-24.10, the com-
mission has not brought nor is it attempting to 
maintain an action in this case and it is not barred 
by that section. In Crismon v. Reich, .·2 Utah 
1111, we held that in the absence of an express 
statutory provision to that effect the county 
assessor may not bring an action to collect taxes 
but is limited to the summary proceedings pro-
vided by statute for that purpose. It is immater-
ial here whether or not the tax commission may 
bring a. separate action to collect this tax. Our 
problem is whether or not the proceeding to seize 
and sell one of the cars of one of the plaintiffs 
which the tax commission is attempting consti-
tutes an action. If so, then such proceeding is 
barred by section 104-2-24.10-otherwise it is not 
barred." (pages 438 and 439') 
The opinion of the court held that the action brought to 
collect the taxes by seizure was barred in eight years, 
the court applying the statute of limitations with respect 
to judgments. The court quoted Section 80-10-l, U.C . .A.., 
19·43, now Section 59-10-1, U.C.A., 1953, that "Every tax 
has the effect of a judgment against the person, . . ." 
Since the question was only the application of the statute 
of limitations, the point now before the court was not 
decided. Recognition was given to Crismon v. Reich 
that in the absence of express statutory provision no 
personal action can be brought for the collection of taxes. 
Mr. Justice Wolfe dissented on the ground that 
the judgment referred to in Section 59-10-1 was not the 
ordinary judgment which was barred by the eight year 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
~tatute o I' I imitations. Whatever Mr. Justice Wolfe said 
in the <'at·w of Hayes v. Gibbs that the statute "smacks 
of an a~~wss1nent against the person" was cleared up by 
hi~ contrary conclusion in the dissenting opinion of the 
Cry~tal Car Line case. The following quotations from 
the di~~Pnting opinion demonstrate this point: 
"B'~r..t our tax statute providing for ad valorem 
taxes on real and personal property do not con-
tain auy general provision for bringing an action 
for the tax and thus obtaining a judicial judgment 
for it although there was at one time in our sta-
tutes provision for suit (Sections 6047, 6090-60912, 
Compiled Laws of Utah, 19'17) and there is now 
provision for the court foreclosure on real estate 
under certain circumstances (Sections 80-10-41 
to 46, U.C.A., 19,43), and for suit to collect taxes 
on livestock in special circumstances (Section 
80-5-27, U.C.A., 1943). (p. 448) 
"I do not think a legislative pronouncement 
that a tax shall have the effect of a judgment 
means the same thing as saying that it shall be 
a judicial judgment which can only be obtained 
by starting a court action. (p. 450) 
"And since there is no statutory provision for 
obtaining a judgment for taxes in a case like this 
a judicial judgment cannot be had. Consequently, 
there is no way in which to obtain a judgment 
which would make the type of execution provided 
for in Chap. 37 of Title 104 applicable. Hence the 
eight years limitation which is part of 8ec. 104-37-
1 does not apply." (p. 450) 
~ls pointed out by nir. Justice Wolfe if there ever 
was any effective statutory authority for the filing of a 
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suit for a personal judgment, such statutes were repealed 
in 1933. Section 88-1-2 Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933 
provides: 
"All acts of a general and permanent nature 
passed by the legislature of the State of Utah 
prior to its twentieth regular session are hereby 
repealed, saving and excepting the following, sub-
ject to the limitations and exceptions herein 
expressed, to wit:" 
Plaintiffs on page 7 of their brief cite 51 Am. Jur. 
Section 984 (erroneously cited 251 Am. Jur.). American 
Juris prudence in laying down the rule on this question 
clearly favors the defendant. We quote from Section 
984 as follows: 
"§ 984. Personal Action against Taxpayer.-In 
many jurisdictions, taxes are by statute declared 
to he debts due by, or are made the personal obli-
gation of, the person or corporation owning the 
property or doing the business upon which the 
tax is levied or imposed, and are recoverable by 
action ;8 however, unless declared so by statute, a 
tax is not a debt in the sense in which the word 
"debt" is ordinarily use.d.9 In many cases it is 
stated broadly that no personal action will lie 
for the recovery of taxes, in the absence of express 
statutory authority therefor. 10 Usually, however, 
the rule is stated in a more guarded form that 
where the statute which creates the tax provides 
a~ special remedy for its collection, such remedy 
is exclusive and preclttdes the bringing of a com-
mon-law action for the recovery of taxes.11" 
Plaintiffs rely upon the case of City of Anchorage v. 
Baker, 376 P.2d. 482. A reading of that case indicates 
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that thP pPr~onal liability arose out of a tax on a lease-
hold intPn'~t whvrP the govern1nent was the owner of the 
property and wn~ the lessor. Footnotes 2 and 3 on page 
-~,-.;~ and the body of the opinion clearly show that the 
personal liability was based upon an amendment to the 
~tatute ~pecifically allowing the personal action. The 
l'ootnoh' states: 
.. In 1962 the statute was amended so as to specific-
ally allow a personal action to recover a tax on a 
lvasehold interest in real property. S!LA 19'6,2, 
Chapter 117." 
Plaintiffs eite and quote at page 10 of their brief 
from S-1 Corpus Juris Secundum Section 643 to the effect 
that in many jurisdictions the owner of real estate is 
personally liable for the taxes. Plaintiffs omitted the 
preceding portions of that section. The preceding por-
tion of the text is as follows:: 
•'At common law there is no personal liability 
on the part of an owner for taxes levied on his 
property, and under 1nany taxing systems there 
is no personal liability for taxes imposed on real 
property, although such taxes may constitute a 
personal obligation which is satisfied and extin-
guished when the property is taken for the 
amount due as taxes." 
If there were cases cited by Corpus Juris Secundum 
which are decided favorable to plaintiffs under statutes 
similar to Ut.ah, it is presumed plaintiffs would have spe-
cifieally cited the cases. It is well established that at 
Conunon Law· there was no personal liability. A specific 
~tatute is necessary to change that law. 
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Counsel for both sides argued this case before the 
trial court principally on statutory construction and the 
decisions of our own Supreme Court which are cited 
above and in plaintiffs' brief. The learned trial judge 
wrote a memorandum decision in favor of the defendant 
there being at the time nothing before the court except 
the plaintiffs' complaint and the motion to dismiss. 
The question of "personal liability" was the principal 
question before the court and this was the principal point 
upon which the decision was rendered in favor of the 
defendant. The learned trial judge stated at page 7: 
('Tr. P.16) 
"In reaching the conclusions that I have ex-
pressed in this memorandum I have read the 
various cases cited by counsel and have made my 
own individual search. I list now a few of them 
without stating to which particular point they 
apply." 
There are then cited seventeen cases, five from the State 
of Utah and the balance from other jurisdictions. They 
all support the proposition that there is no personal 
liability for real property taxes. There is one Utah case 
not hereinabove mentioned, Peterson v. Ogden City, 111 
Utah 125, 176 P.2d 599. As stated in headnote 1, the case 
held that Ogden City was restricted to the ordinance for 
the procedure to enforce a special assessment and could 
not foreclose a special assessment lien in a judicial pro-
cedure. 
For the court's information, the following are the 
cases cited by Judge Keller, which we· think are particu-
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larly in point and which we cite herein in support of 
P()int Ill: 
I ~oa rd of Cmnrnissioners of Ness County v. 
l I ooper et al, 110 I\::an. 501, 204 Pac. 536 
llawkin~ v. Srnith, 106 Mont. 453, 78 P.2d 74 
Ntah~ PX r<:>l. Spokane and Eastern Trust Co. v. 
Nicholson, County Treasurer, 7 4 Mont. 346, 
~-1:0 Pac. 837 
Nantos v. Sirnon, 60 Ariz. 426, 138 P.2d 89'6 
~Iaricopa County v. Arizona Tractor & Equip-
ment Co., 57 Ariz. 49, 109 P.2d 618 
~le Donald v. Duckworth, 197 Okl. 576, 173 P.2d 
436 
Allen v. I-Ienshaw, 197 Okl. 1123, 168 P.2d. 625 
City of Salem v. Marion County, 171 Ore. 254, 
137 P.2d 977 
Pugd Sound Power & Light Co. v. Cowlitz 
County, 38 Wash. 2d 907, 234 P.2d 506·. 
\r e acknowledge our indebtedness to the learned trial 
judge for this research and the many cases in other states 
supporting his decision and the defendant's view. While 
t':.teh ease could be analyzed, to do so would probably ex-
tend this brief beyond its proper size. However, we will 
take the liberty of quoting from the case of Board of 
Commissioners of v/ess County v.llooper et al, 110 Kan. 
;)01, ~0-1 Pac. 536: 
"It is argued for the county that although 
there is no statute covering this subject the prin-
ciple involved in the statutes relating to the dispo-
sition of personal property without the payment 
of ta."'\:es can be invoked to help perfect a liability 
on defendant in this case. In short, by a plausible 
course of reasoning, the county board argues that 
this court, by principles of analogy and deduction, 
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should declare the law to be what the Legislature 
itself could declare, but what the Legislature has 
not yet declared - that where the owner of pro-
perty willfully damages the realty by removal 
of improvements therefrom he is personally liable 
in damages to the county if the realty thus dam-
aged will not sell for enough to pay the county's 
lien for taxes. It can hardly be said that the want 
of legislation on this subject arises through mere 
oversight. More likely it arises through studied 
restraint. Having the matter of loss of taxes and 
evasion of taxes in mind, and having legislated 
repeatedly touching the making away with per-
sonal property without payment of the taxes 
thereon, the Legislature must have had its eyes 
open to the fact that taxes on real estate are 
occasionally lost or rendered uncollectable by the 
destruction or removal of improvements from the 
freehold. So frequently have owners of real estate 
removed improvements therefrom without paying 
the accrued and delinquent taxes that it cannot be 
said that the Legislature has never considered the 
subject. As early as 1889 the removal of improve-
ments from mortgaged property to the prejudice 
of the mortgagee had become sufficiently grave 
to justify the fixing of statutory liabilities, both 
civil and criminal, for such misdeeds. Gen. Stat. 
1915,, §§ 6479-6481. The whole matter of taxation 
is statutory; the means for the recovery of de-
linquent taxes is prescribed by statute, and does 
not exist apart from the statute. 
"Whatever the abstract merit of the county's 
contention, it is one which should be addressed to 
the Legislature, and not to the judiciary. The 
judgment of the trial court was correct." (pp. 
536-537). 
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POINT IV 
E\' EN IF THE PLAINTIFFS OR ANY CONSTITUTED 
AUTHORITY IS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT FOR TAXES, 
THAT .JUDGMENT HAS ALREADY BEEN ENTERED AND 
THERE MAY NOT BE ANOTHER JUDGMENT. 
Plaintiffs strongly rely upon Section 59-10-1, U.C.A., 
1~)~>~1, for their right to sue in this case. Plaintiffs quote 
the statute as follows : 
"Every tax has the effect of a judgment 
against the person .... The judgment is not s:atis-
fiPd nor the lien removed until the taxes are paid 
or the property sold for the payment thereof." 
It seems obvious that whatever judgment is author-
izt>d by the foregoing section, that the judgment is al-
rPady entered. A second judgment cannot be based upon 
a 8tatutP that says a judgment already exists. The learn-
ed trial judge well stated his position on this question, as 
follows: 
.. Furthermore, if the tax has the effect of a judg-
nlent what, one may ask, gives rise to the necessity 
of bringing a suit before a judicial tribunal to get 
another judgment." (page 5 of the memorandum 
decision Tr. P. 14) 
POINT V 
THE JUDGMENT PROVIDED FOR BY SECTION 59-10-1 
WAS SATISFIED BY THE TAX SALE TO SAN JUAN 
COUNTY PURSUANT TO SECTION 59-10-33. 
\Yith respect to the judgment provided for by Sec-
tion 59-10-1, we quote again that "the judgment is not 
~atisfied nor the lien removed until the taxes are paid 
or the property sold for the pa.yment thereof." 
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Certainly there is clear intent that the judgment 
upon which plainiffs rely (and which existed without the 
necessity of filing this action) was satisfied when "the 
property (was) sold for the payment thereof." The 
trial court in its memorandum decision gave this as one 
of its reasons for judgment in favor of the defendant. 
The proposition is weTI stated in the following language: 
(Page 5 memorandum decision, Tr. p.14) 
"In the interest of brevity I state merely the 
sections, to wit; 59'-10-3, 59-10-29, 59-10-33 and 
59-10-35 from which in my judgment one must 
conclude that the judgment referred to in 59-10-1 
is satisfied and which supports the position of the 
defendant; namely, that the taxes claimed have 
been paid by a sale of the property." 
Plaintiffs claim that the remedy provided for by 
the statutory provision cited by the trial court is "only 
a cumulative remedy," citing Section 59-10-47, U.C.A., 
1953. An examination of the tax statutes clearly shows 
that the remedy referred to by S.ection 59-10-47 as cumu-
lative is a complete independent remedy not involved 
herein. See Sections 59'-10-42 through 59-10-47. It is a 
remedy by foreclosure. It is cumulative to the remedy 
set forth in the sections referred to in the above quotation 
from the opinion of the trial judge. It is significant 
that no deficiency judgment is permitted in such pro-
ceedings. 
Following the quotation from S.ection 59-10-47, plain-
tiffs (at pages 13 and 14) cite as apparent additional 
authority as to cumulative rights the cases of Fisher 
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v. Jr'ri,rJhl, 101. Utah -Hi!), 1:2:: P.:2d 703, and Auson v. 
Hllisou et a!, 10-1- Utah raG, 1-1-0 P.2d 653. 
ln tlu· Fish(•r emw a purchaser of a tax title was 
nttPmpting to l'on•elmw a tax lien apparently pursuant to 
~~·dion~ ;->D-1 0--1-:2 through 59-10-47, U.C.A .. 1953, the sec-
tion~ at the ti1ne of this case being 80-10-41 through 
,...;0-10--1-G R. S. l :., 1933. The court held that since the 
plaintiff had rpct_•ived a tax title he could not again have 
furt l~t·r proceedings by way of foreclosure. Speaking 
a~ i I' the plaintiff "·en• in the position of the county (and 
thi~ i~ tlw best position the plaintiff could claim), the 
court ~aid: 
.. If the county proceeds to satisfy its lien in the 
ordinary way- by auditors deed and May sale-
there is no necessity for even considering the fore-
e losure proeedure as the latter is just another 
way of accomplishing the same objectives - eol-
lection of taxes." 
The reasoning of this court, far from holding that 
there is an alternative remedy by an action for "personal 
liability," holds that if there is a sale to the county and 
the eounty reeeives a deed there cannot also be an action 
to foreclose. Applying this reasoning to our case, if the 
tax constitutes a judgn1ent there cannot be a seeond 
judgment. Furthermore the judgment is satisfied by the 
sale to the county. The fact that there was a tax deed as 
well as a preliminary sale in the above case does not 
lh'l'Pssarily mean that the sale alone does not satisfy 
the judgment as that is what Seetion 59-10-1 says. 
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In the case of Anson v. Ellison the plaintiff was at-
tempting to quiet title based upon an invalid tax deed. 
Salt Lake City was a party defendant and claimed a lien 
on the property for a special assessement. With respec1 
to the right of the county and the question of the tax 
debt and the right of the plainiff to have foreclosure, 
the court said : 
"The lien which is given to the county is a right 
to resort to the property for the tax debt, but 
where the tax debt is paid by a sale to a private 
purchaser, the debt is paid and the right to resort 
to the property (by the City for special assess-
ment) is gone." 
If this case is to be taken for anything, it is that 
a sale of the property to the county pays the debt just 
as stated in Section 59-10-1. It is submitted that author-
ities cited under Point IV in plaintiffs' brief fall far 
short of indicating any statutory authority or precedent 
by judicial decision for an action involving "personal 
liability." 
POINT VI 
IN THIS CASE THERE CAN BE NO VALID AD VAL-
OREM REAL PROPERTY TAXES FOR 1960, 1961, AND 1962 
FOR THE REASON THAT THERE WAS NO PROPERTY 
VALUE AT ANY TIME DURING SAID THREE YEARS. 
The statutory provsion under which the taxes in 
question were levied is contained in Section 59-5-57. 
Until19·5·3 that statute provided as follows: 
"All metalliferous mines and mining claims, both 
placer and rock in place, shall be assessed at $5 per 
acre and in addition thereto at a value equal to 
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two timP~ tiH' net annual proceeds thereof for the 
eah'tHlar yt>ar next preceding." 
TIH' U););~ lugislatun', because of the fluctuation in 
proet>l'(l~ l't'om year to Yl'ar an1ended Section 59-5-57 so 
u~ to a~~PSS the mine on the basis of the average net 
proceed~ for the 3 preceding years. The statute as 
amPnd.Pd then read as follows: 
"All Inetalliferous mines and mining claims, both 
placer and rock in place, shall be assessed at $5 
per acre and in addition thereto at a value equal 
to two times the average net annual proceeds 
thPrl'of for the three calendar years next preceding 
or for as Inany years next preceding as the mine 
has been operating, whichever is less." (Session 
Laws 19·53, Chapter 107) 
ThP result of this amendment as it has been inter-
prPtt>d has had the effect of imposing upon worked out 
mim's, taxPs, for 2 additional years. The actual effect 
in this easl' has been to impose an ad valorem tax for 
3 yetu·s after the property has become valuelss. (At-
h'mpted relief by the tax commission with respect to 
the second and third years is outlined under Point VIII 
lwn'after.) 
It is alleged in the complaint and agreed by the 
stipulation that the property in question had no value 
on January 1, 1960, or from that time on. See paragraph 
j (Tr. P. ~) of plaintiffs' first cause of action and para-
graph 5 (Tr. P. 19) of the stipulation. The allegation 
with respect to the fact that the property had no value 
aJ)pears to have been omitted from plaintiffs' second 
eanse of action, but the stipulation still applies. 
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While our constitutional provision, Section 4, Article 
XIII provides that mining claims "shall be assessed as 
the legislature shall provide," it does not state that min-
ing property or property of any kind can be assessed for 
ad valorem tax purposes where the property has no value 
whatsoever in the year of the tax. The Constitution does 
not say or even suggest that the legislature shall provide 
for the taxation of mining claims based upon net proceeds 
in years prior to the tax. It is the legislature which de-
cided, in carrying out the constitutional provision, to 
assess the property on the basis of net proceeds in prior 
years. On the contrary, the Constitution, Sections 2 
and 3 of Article XIII, require value in the year of the tax. 
ARTICLE XIII 
Section 2. "All tangible property in the state, 
not exempt under the laws of the United States, 
or under this constitution, shall be taxed in pro-
portion to its value, to be ascertained as provided 
by law." 
Section 3. "The Legislature shall provide by law 
a uniform and equal rate of assessment and tax-
ation on all tangible property in the State, accord-
ing to its value in money, and shall prescribe by 
law such regulation as shall secure a just valua-
tion for taxation of such property, so that every 
person and corporation shall pay a tax, in propor-
tion to the value of his, her, or its tangible proper-
ty, .... " 
An exact case in point and which has held that there 
can be no tax where there is no value on January 1, of 
the year of the tax of mining claims, is South Utah Mines 
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and 8ml'ltcrs 1'. /l('(l/'cr Co~ntty, 262 F.S. 325, 67 L. Ed. 
::~;>. That <·ast- nro~P upon the ntten1pt of Beaver County 
to tax ~onth Ftah ~I ines and Smelters for the year 1919 
upon net proet-Pds in the prior year. South Utah Mines 
and ~nwlb·r~ had net proceeds for the year 1918 from 
workings of a tailings du1np. The mine itself was worked 
out as of January 1, 1919. The United States Supreme 
Court IH·ld su('h tax on the mine invalid because the net 
proePPd~ for1nula bore no relation to value on January 1, 
UlU), which value was zero. Mr. Justice Sutherland de-
livt>rPd the opinion of the court stating: 
"The 'Constitution of Utah declares (§§ 2 and 
3, art. 13) that all property in the state shall be 
taxed in proportion to its value, and requires the 
legislature to provide a uniform and equal rate 
according to its value in money, and prescribe such 
regulations as shall secure a just valuation for 
the taxation of all property, so that every person 
and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion 
to such value. By an amendment to § 4, art. 13, 
adopted in 1918, it is provided that all metallifer-
ous mines or mining claims, in addition to an 
arbitrary valuation of $5 per acre, shall be as-
sessed 'at a value based on some multiple or sub-
multiple of the net annual proceeds thereof. All 
other mines or mining claims and other valuable 
n1ineral deposits, including lands containing coal 
or hydrocarbons shall be assessed at their full 
value.' 
* * * 
'·The state Constitution plainly contemplates 
that all property, irrespective of its character, 
shall be taxed 'according to its value in money.' 
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"The provision with reference to the taxation of 
metalliferous mines does not mean to depart from 
this rule, but recognizes that their value cannot 
be determined in the ordinary way, since the ores 
which constitute the wealth of such property are 
hidden in the earth, and, as a general thing, dis-
closure of their extent and character must await 
extraction. The Constitution, therefore, provides 
not for disregarding value in the assessment of 
taxes upon mines, but for arriving at it in a 
special manner, - that is, by a measurement pro-
portioned to the net annual proceeds derived from 
the property. The value of property bears a re-
lation to the income which it affords. If it be pro-
perty whose production is uniform and of indefin-
ite duration, the capitalization of the net income 
derived from it at the going rate of interest, in 
the absence of a more certain method, will furnish 
a reasonable measure of the value. The life of a 
mine, however, is limited. The extraction of ores 
from year to year constitutes a constant drain 
upon the capital, which, in course of time, will be 
exhausted. It follows that a given multiple of 
the net proceeds, which may be a fair measure 
of value in the early part of a mine's development, 
will become excessive as the stage of exhaustion 
approaches. The constitutional provision, there-
fore, at best, will produce only approximate equal-
ity. Undoubtedly, in fixing the multiple of (a31) 
the net annual proceeds upon which the value of 
metalliferous mines is to be calculated, a good deal 
of latitude must be allowed the legislature and 
the taxing authorities, but the power is not un-
bounded. Without attempting to delimit the bown-
daries,-a matter primarily for the state courts,-
it is sufficient for present purposes to say that, 
in our opinion, they have been clearly exceeded in 
the instant case. The net proceeds here involved 
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armw from a lot of refuse Inaterial, which, long 
prior to the i1nposition of the tax, had been sev-
l'l'Pd frmn the 1nining claims, removed to a dis-
tmH'P, suhmitted to the process of reduction, and 
stored upon lands separate and apart from the 
claim~. ~I oreover, but one tenth of the amount of 
tlwse net proceeds was realized by the owner of 
tht> mining clain1s. To treble the total of these 
pro<'t>Pds for the purpose of basing thereon an al-
together fictitious value for a mine worked out 
and worthless years before the adoption of the 
statutory provision supposed to confer the author-
it~' to do so results in such flagrant and palpable 
injustice as would cast the most serious doubt 
upon the constitutionality of such provisions if 
thus construed. 
* * * 
"While the taxing authorities cannot be held 
to an inflexible rule of equality, even in respect 
of properties in the same classification where 
their nature is such as to practically preclude the 
application of such a rule, it does not follow that 
all distinctions are to be ignored and indubitably 
dissimilar and readily distinguishable things 
treated as though they were the same. It may 
well be that the taxable value of mines differing 
in extent of development or in degree of exhaus-
tion, and relatively of different actual values, 
must, from the practical necessities of the case, 
be subjected to the same rule of measurement, 
although it 1nay work inequality to some extent. 
But the difference between a mine from which 
ore is still bei,ng or still may be extra.cted and net 
income derired, ond one conceded to be an empty 
shell, zcith no present or prospective value what-
soever, is so obrious that the imposition of a tax 
upon the basis of their being, nevertheless, one 
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and the same, cannot be sustained with due regard 
for either law or logic." 
Section 4 of Article XIII of our Constitution in effect 
at the time of that case read as follows: 
"Sec. 4. All metalliferous mines or mining 
claims, both placer and rock in place shall be as-
sessed at $5·.00 per acre, and in addition thereto 
at a value based on some multiple or sub-multiple 
of the net annual proceeds thereof." (1917 Ses-
sion Laws P. 474) 
The present Section 4, Article XIII of our Constitution 
provides: 
"All metalliferous mines or mining claims, 
both placer :and rock in place, shall be assessed as 
the Legislature shall provide; provided, the basis 
and multiple now used in determining the value 
of metalliferous mines for taxation purposes and 
the additional assessed value of $5.00 per acre 
thereof shall not be changed before January 1, 
1935, nor thereafter until otherwise provided by 
law .... " 
Sections 2 and 3 of Article XIII relied upon by Mr. 
Justice Sutherland in the South Utah Mines case that 
there must be value in the year of the tax are the same 
now as then. 
In addition to Sections 2 and 3 of Article XIII, we 
call attention to Section 1 which provides with respect 
to revenue and taxation that the fiscal year "shall begin 
on the first day of January unless changed by the Legis-
lature." 
POINT VII 
IN THIS CASE THERE CAN BE NO VALID AD VAL-
OREM REAL PROPERTY TAXES FOR THE YEARS 1960, 
1961 AND 1962 FOR THE REASON THAT THERE WAS NO 
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OWNERSHIP BY THE DEFENDANT DURING THE YEARS 
IN QUESTION. 
A mining daitn is a possessory right resulting from 
eompliatl<'P with Federal and State laws with respect 
to t hP location of 1nining claims. It is this possessory 
rig-ht that plaintiffs are clailning to tax. There must be 
owtH'r~hip of property before there can be taxation. In 
t'aet, there eannot be property in the legal sense without 
tlwre hPing ownership. Black's Law Dictionary defines 
"Property" as follows: (4th Edition page 1382) 
"That which is peculiar or proper to any 
1wr~on; that which belongs exclusively to one; in 
the strict legal sense, an aggregate of rights which 
arP guaranteed and protected by the government." 
~eetion 59-3-1 in describing real estate provides: 
" (a) The possession of, claim to, ownership 
of or right to the possession of, land. 
"(b) All mines, minerals and quarries in and 
n;pder the land, all timber belonging to individuals 
or corporations growing or being on the lands of 
this state or the United States, and all rights and 
pricileges appertaining thereto." 
It is stipulated (paragraph 5 of the stipulation 
Tr. P. 19, 20) that the 1nining claims in question had no 
value in the years of the purported tax, that the last 
mining operations were in December, 1959, and that in 
December, 1959, defendant abandoned the claims and 
"has not claimed ownership therein since before January 
l, 1960/' That a mining claim ceases to exist on aban-
donn1ent, see :2 Lindley on :Jiines page 1593 where it is 
stated: "Abandonment terminates a right." Also in 
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Section·642 of 2 Lindley on Mines at pages 1589 and 1590, 
there is a discussion "as to the character of the right 
which is granted by the United States to a locator." 
One of the characteristics of this right is RtatPfl as 
follows: 
" ( 3) His interest in the claim may also be 
forfeited by his abandonment, with an intention 
to renounce his right of possession. It cannot be 
doubted that an actual abandonment of possession 
by a locator of a mining claim, such as would 
work an abandon1nent of any other easement, 
would terminate all the right of possession which 
the locator then had." 
It follows from the stipulated fact of abandonment 
in 19'59 that at no time during the three taxable years in 
question did defendant have any ownership in the mining 
claims in question. The mining claims as such ceased in 
December of 1959. 
Because there was no ownership, nor property be-
longing to the defendant, on or after January 1, 1960 
there could not be a tax constitutionally imposed under 
Article XIII, Sections 2 and 3, supra. 
POINT VIII 
THE REGULATIONS OF THE TAX COMMISSION AND 
SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATION BY THE 1963 LEGISLATURE 
ARE RECOGNITIONS OF THE INEQUITY OF THE TAX 
AND ITS INVALIDITY UNDER SECTIONS 2 AND 3 OF 
ARTICLE XIII UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
The position of the defendant in this case may cause 
some anxiety with respect to the loss of taxes. If this 
be so, we may likewise say that these taxes running for 
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yt•ar~ after a mine i~ worked out have been the cause 
ot' nuxit>ty on the part of the defendant. Anxiety on 
l'ithPr sidt- or both should, of course, play no part in the 
dt•ei~ion of this cn~e, hut there is some history, of which 
wn hPiiPVI' this court 1nay take judicial notice, and 
rl'mPdial lt~gislation which we also believe should be 
~·allt•d to the eourt's attention. 
In 1 ~);>~) the tax connnission had promulgated the fol-
lowing rPgnlation ·with respect to the assessment of 
unpatt•nted mining claims: 
"The computation of net proceeds valuation 
will l>t• handled as in the past, i.e., the prior three 
~·pars' production will be considered in arriving 
at value PVPn though mining has ceased and in 
all eases a value will be assessed for three years 
following the year in which production has 
eeased; however, in the case of unpa.tented claims, 
if a tilnely protest is made by the taxpayer, and 
if in the opinion of the Commission the mineral 
n1lues have been removed, the Commission may 
order suspension of valuation based on prior net 
proceeds in years following the first year immed-
intt'ly subsequent to that year in which production 
ceased. It is the intention of the Commission to 
apply a net proceeds valuation for the same 
ntunber of years that the mine produced ore. 
"There is no change in the methods used in the 
rase of patented n1ining claims." 
By an opinion dated September 29, 1959, the At-
torney General held this regulation invalid. 
The 1963 legislature, amended Section 59-5-57 by 
inserting the following: 
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" ... provided, however, there shall be no valu-
ation based upon net annual proceeds of uranium 
or vanadium mines for the purpose of assessment 
of any such mine or mining claim for any one 
year in which there were no gross proceeds real-
ized in the year next preceding the year of assess-
ment." 
This amendment, if in existence at the time of the 
taxes in question, would have relieved the defendant of 
the tax for 1961 in the amount of $222,240.66 and the 
tax for the year 19'62 in the amount of $113;661.9'6. As-
suming but without admitting the net proceeds tax to be 
valid in a case where the mine has been worked out 
and legally abandoned the liability of the defendant 
under the regulation of the tax commission cited above 
would only be the first year's tax of $288,204.50 instead 
of the total amount sued for ($6·24,107.12). Plaintiffs 
have, nevertheless, stood firrn on their claim under the 
statute for three years' taxes of $624,107.12. Defendant 
does not criticize the tax commission for its attempt to 
enforce the statutory provisions as interpreted by the 
Attorney General. Defendant asks only that it not be 
criticized or prejudiced for standing upon its legal rights. 
Another amendment, not pertinent to this case, but 
which will hereafter give relief to the State and counties 
where ore bodies are of short duration was passed in 
19'63 amending Section 5·9-5-65. That amendment pro-
vided: 
". . . that the tax commission, in order to insure 
the payment and collection of the ad valorem 
property tax imposed against uranium and vala-
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dium mining- prop(•rtiP~, may require the owner 
or tlw }H·rson engaged in mining the same to 
dPpo::-;it with it ~uch security as the tax commis-
sion ~hall dd(•nnine." 
The ::-;petion furthPr provides for the sale of the 
~t·eurity whPn necessary. It would seem that this very 
provi::-;ion i~ eontrary to the idea of "personal liability" 
in tlw ::-;pn::-;p that an action can be maintained against 
the owner. 
POINT IX 
A PROPER CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 59-5-57 RE-
QUIRES THE ELIMINATION OF THE T'AXEiS FOR 1961 
AND 1962. 
It is the defendant's contention that there should 
han• been no 1961 or 1962 tax under the statute prior to 
tht• 1963 runend1nent. The language of Section 59-5-57, 
as it existt>d in those years (and still exists for that 
matter) was that metalliferous mines should be assessed, 
.. . . . at a value equal to two times the average 
nt>t annual proceeds thereof for the three calendar 
years next preceding or for as many years next 
preceding as the n~ine has been operating, which-
ever is less; ... " 
It is our contention that under that language it was the 
intention of the legislature that for there to be an assess-
ment based on net proceeds the mine must have been 
in operation in the year "next preceding." This con-
~trnrtion would allow only a tax for one year after 
closing operations. 
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CONCLUSION 
In order to reverse the decision of the trial court, 
this court must determine all of the following proposi-
tions to be true and correct : 
1. Either the state tax commission or San Juan 
County has the right to sue the defendant in this case 
for a tax which is payable only to the county treasurer 
of San Juan County and for which payment only the 
treasurer of San Juan County can give a receipt. 
2. There is a "personal liability" for real property 
taxes by the owner. 
3. Section 59-10-1, providing that "E,very tax has 
the effect of a judgment against the person ... " may be 
construed to mean that an additoinal judgment for 
personal liability can be entered. 
4. Even though Section 59-10-1 provides that "the 
judgment (therein provided) is not satisfied nor the 
lien removed until the taxes are paid or the property sold 
for the payment thereof," such judgment continues even 
though the property has been sold pursuant to Section 
59-10-33, U.C.A., 19'5·3. 
5. ·There may be a valid ad valorem real property 
tax when in the year of the tax it is admitted that the 
property taxed had no value. 
·6. There may be a tax on real property when in the 
year of the tax the defendant owned no property. 
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7. 'rlwn~ is no violation of either Sections 2 and 3 
ol' .\ rtit•l(' X lll of the Utah Constitution which requires 
all tangihlt> propt•rty in the state to be taxed on "a uni-
form and t><tual rate of assessment" in cases where the 
propt>rty ha~ no value and the defendant doesn't own it. 
( 
1 onvt>r~ely, if this court finds that any one of the 
l'on•going propositions is not true and correct, the judg-
ttH'nt ol' tht> trial court Inust be affirmed. 
The nw~t novel question in this case is the attempt 
by tlw Ntatt> Ta..x Co1n1nission to impose personal liability 
upon a taxpayer for failure to pay real property taxes. 
A decision on this point alone is sufficient to dispose 
of this ease. 
Respectfully submitted , 
MARR, vVILKINS & CANNON 
PAUL B. CANNON 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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